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INTRODUCTION
In 2003, Congress passed the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT).1
The Act was passed as a response to the Supreme Court's 2002
decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,2 which held unconsti-
tutionally overbroad two provisions of the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) relating to what material could
permissibly be described as child pornography. This Note will argue
that the statutory amendments to reconstitute the definition of child
pornography in the PROTECT Act are a constitutionally sound
response to the Supreme Court's concerns and can survive a facial
challenge in the courts. Portions of the Act's obscenity offense,
however, are likely unconstitutional.
This Note will begin in Part I by providing a background to the
issue. Part I will describe the traditional concerns associated with
child pornography, its dangers, and the rationale behind its
proscription. It will then briefly outline the Supreme Court's past
cases with regard to the First Amendment generally and as applied
to obscenity and child pornography specifically. Part II will describe
the CPPA, the statute at issue in Free Speech Coalition. Part III will
examine the Supreme Court's decision in Free Speech Coalition.
Part IV will analyze the PROTECT Act and will conclude that the
revised statutory definition of child pornography no longer
contains within its purview a substantial amount of otherwise
protected speech. Further, its reconstituted affirmative defense now
adequately protects those individuals on its face. Moreover, the
revised statutory definition and the affirmative defense work in
tandem to create a rebuttable presumption that is constitutionally
sound under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Finally, this Note will argue that the creation of an obscenity
offense for distribution and possession of virtual child pornography
is a valiant effort to eliminate those materials not proscribable as
1. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
2. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
3. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009,3009-26 to -32 (1996) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), invalidated in part by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535
U.S. 234 (2002).
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child pornography. Because the PROTECT Act's obscenity offense
fails to fully apply the Court's standard of obscenity as defined in
Miller v. California,4 however, it will not survive judicial review in
its current form.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT DEBATE
A. The Dangers of Child Pornography
Before delving into the legal issues surrounding the First
Amendment's protection of free speech and its application to child
pornography, it is important first to consider the impact of pornogra-
phy's production and dissemination. Traditional child pornography,
which includes actual children in its production, necessarily
involves the sexual abuse or exploitation of children.5 Victims of
child sexual abuse "frequently experience feelings of guilt and
responsibility for the abuse and betrayal, a sense of powerlessness,
and feelings of worthlessness and low self-esteem."' They often
display symptoms of nightmares and flashbacks associated with
posttraumatic stress.7 In attempting to cope with the traumatic
events associated with child sexual abuse, victims often suffer from
substance abuse and depression, can become involved in prostitu-
tion, or even attempt suicide.8
4. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
5. See EVA J. KLAIN ET AL., ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW FOR THE NAT'L CTR. FOR
MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: THE CRIMINAL-JUsTICE-SYSTEM
RESPONSE 9 (2001), available at http://www.missingkids.com/enUS/publications/ NC81.pdf.
The term "child pornography" is used loosely here to mean sexually explicit imagery in
general rather than that imagery under its legal definition per se. For a discussion of the
current legal definition of child pornography, see infra notes 73-75, 134-39 and accompanying
text. This Note uses the term "traditional child pornography" to distinguish sexually explicit
imagery that includes actual children in its production from that which is created digitally
and may not involve the use of actual children-"virtual child pornography." See discussion
infra Parts II, WV.A.
6. KLAIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 10.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 10-11.
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As Eva Klain for the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children has noted:
All these effects may be exacerbated when pornography is
involved. Child victims of pornography face the possibility of a
lifetime of victimization because the pornography can be
distributed indefinitely. Physical, psychological, and emotional
effects of child sexual abuse are coupled with the possibility of
the pornography resurfacing. Being photographed during sexual
abuse intensifies the child's shame, humiliation, and powerless-
ness. In addition children tend to blame themselves for their
involvement in pornography, and this makes the experience that
much more painful.9
Producers and possessors of child pornography use the sexually
explicit material in several ways. The material serves as a "perma-
nent record for arousal and gratification" of the abuse of the
victimized child. 10 But even more crucial to the well-being of the
child, offenders can use the material to blackmail victims by
threatening to show the material to others so that the victim is too
afraid to go to the police or his parents to tell them he has been
abused." The material is also often traded or sold, perpetuating the
existence of the photographic record of the victim's abuse. 2 Finally,
the material is used by pedophiles "to lower children's inhibitions to
engage in sexual behavior" and "to make adult-child sexual activity
appear 'normal.'"'"
B. The Supreme Court Weighs In: Pornography and the First
Amendment
1. First Amendment Jurisprudence Generally
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
9. Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
10. Id. at 6.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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speech." 4 Generally, the Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment's guarantee means that content-based restrictions on
speech are subject to the so-called "strict scrutiny" standard. To
survive judicial review, the government's interest in restricting
constitutionally protected speech must be compelling.'" Even then,
the government's regulation "must be narrowly tailored to promote
[the] compelling Government interest,"6 meaning it must "choose[U
the least restrictive means to further" that interest. 7
The Supreme Court has determined, however, that some catego-
ries of speech may be regulated and restricted despite the
protections of the First Amendment. This is because the Court has
deemed these narrow categories of speech to be "of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." 8 Among these categories are defamation, 9 incitement,2"
and fighting words.2' In addition, there are two categories of speech
this Note will be looking at more closely: obscenity and child
pornography.
2. Defining the Standard of Obscenity: Miller v. California
For many years, the Supreme Court struggled with the concept
of obscenity.22 In Roth v. United States, the Court held that the First
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
16. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
17. Sable Commc'ns, 492 U.S. at 126.
18. R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
19. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254-58, 266 (1952). Even then, for a public
official to recover damages for an allegedly defamatory statement regarding his official
conduct, it must be shown that the statement was made with actual malice. N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). In other words, the statement must be made "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false." Id. at 280.
20. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that a state may
proscribe the advocacy of violence and lawless conduct where it "is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
21. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (noting that fighting words are "those
personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter
of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction").
22. The Court took notice of this struggle in New York v. Ferber by referring to Justice
Harlan's description of it as "the intractable obscenity problem." 458 U.S. 747, 754 (1982)
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Amendment did not protect obscenity.2" Although ideas with "even
the slightest redeeming social importance ... have the full protection
of the [First Amendment]," obscenity, the Court observed, was
"utterly without redeeming social importance."'
The Court in Roth found that the proper standard for determining
obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."2" In Jacobellis v.
Ohio, a plurality of the Court held that "contemporary community
standards" referred "not to state and local 'communities,' but rather
to 'the community' in the sense of 'society at large.'"2" Thus, the
definition of obscenity became a national standard and did not
change depending on geographic location. Rather, it would vary
only with the passage of time." The Court, however, only summarily
determined that the film in question in Jacobellis was not obscene.29
Indeed, the trouble with the standard was that it left the factfinder
unable to articulate why the material in question was obscene. As
Justice Stewart famously noted in Jacobellis, "I know it when I see
it."30
In A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Attorney General,3 l a three-justice plurality of the
Supreme Court further complicated the rule by holding that for the
Roth standard to apply,
three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive
because it affronts contemporary community standards relating
(quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
23. 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
24. Id. at 484.
25. Id. at 489.
26. 378 U.S. 184, 193 (1964) (plurality opinion).
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. "We have viewed the film, in the light of the record made in the trial court, and we
conclude that it is not obscene within the standards enunciated in Roth .... " Id. at 196.
30. Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
31. 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion).
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to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c)
the material is utterly without redeeming social value.32
Finally, the Court revealed how split it was in the per curiam
opinion of Redrup v. New York.33 With two Justices dissenting, a
seven-Justice majority found constitutional violations in each of the
three consolidated cases, but did so on four different grounds.34
A majority of the Court finally coalesced in Miller v. California.5
The Court in Miller criticized the third prong of the Memoirs test
because it forced the prosecution in an obscenity case to "prove a
negative," which it viewed as "a burden virtually impossible to
discharge."36 The Court then formulated the obscenity standard as
it remains today:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.3
The Court in Miller also rejected the "national" community standard
approach put forth by the plurality in Jacobellis and upheld the
statute's use of the community standards of the forum state.38
32. Id. at 418.
33. 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam).
34. As stated by the Court:
Two members of the Court have consistently adhered to the view that a State
is utterly without power to suppress, control or punish the distribution of any
writings or pictures upon the ground of their "obscenity." A third has held to the
opinion that a State's power in this area is narrowly limited to a distinct and
clearly identifiable class of material. Others have subscribed to a not dissimilar
standard, holding that a State may not constitutionally inhibit the distribution
of literary material as obscene unless [the three Memoirs elements have been
met]. Another Justice has not viewed the "social value" element as an
independent factor in the judgment of obscenity.
Id. at 770-71 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
35. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
36. Id. at 22.
37. Id. at 24 (citations omitted) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,489 (1957)).
38. Id. at 30-34. The Supreme Court has applied the same standard for state obscenity
legislation as announced in Miller to federal legislation. United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels
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3. Possession of Obscene Materials: Stanley v. Georgia
One would suppose that if a state could constitutionally prohibit
the dissemination of obscene materials under Miller, a state would
also be able to prohibit its possession. Yet, despite upholding bans
on the public display and distribution of obscene materials, the
Court in Stanley v. Georgia held that it was unconstitutional for a
state to ban the "mere private possession" of obscene materials.39
The Court noted that in this context, the question took on an "added
dimension"-that of the right of privacy.4°
Georgia asserted and the Court rejected three arguments in favor
of the statute. First, Georgia contended that it had an interest in
protecting a person's mind "from the effects of obscenity."41 The
Court rejected this argument because although a state may control
the dissemination of materials detrimental to public morality, it
may not "control the moral content of a person's thoughts."42 Second,
Georgia argued that possession of obscene materials could lead to
"deviant sexual behavior or crimes of violence."43 To the Court,
however, even if the assertion were true, the proper way to deal
with such a problem would be through the traditional means of
preventing crimes: education and prosecution for criminal acts.44
Finally, the majority rejected the notion that a ban on possession
was a necessary means of banning the distribution of obscene
materials. According to the Court, easing the administration of
distribution laws did not justify the infringement on one's personal
liberty "to read or observe what he pleases. " "
of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129-30 (1973). In federal cases, the "community" from
whose standards the factfinder determines whether material is obscene is the federal judicial
district in which the case arises. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1974).
39. 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
40. Id. at 564.
41. Id. at 565.
42. Id. at 565-66.
43. Id. at 566.
44. See id. at 566-67.
45. Id. at 567-68.
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4. A New Class of Unprotected Speech: Child Pornography and
New York v. Ferber
Thirteen years later, the Court addressed the application of its
obscenity cases with respect to child pornography and held in New
York v. Ferber that states could ban the dissemination of sexually
explicit materials displaying children, regardless of whether the
material was obscene.4" Although noting the risk that some child
pornography laws may conflict with the First Amendment, the
Court determined that in this context states are "entitled to greater
leeway."47 The Court then gave four rationales for its holding.
The Court reasoned first that states have a compelling interest in
both physically and psychologically protecting children.' It thus
gave great deference to the legislative judgment of New York that
"use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to
the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child."49
Second, the Court found that the dissemination of child pornogra-
phy was related to the sexual abuse of children in that it "produced
... a permanent record of the children's participation." ° Additionally,
the Court argued that the sexual abuse of children in producing the
pornographic materials could only be effectively controlled by
shutting down the chain of distribution.51 Third, the distribution of
child pornography created an incentive to produce such materials
and victimize children in the process. 2 Fourth, the Court found that
the value of such materials was extremely low, and, even in the
unlikely event that the depiction of a child engaged in sexual
conduct was necessary for artistic or literary reasons, a person
above the statutory age who resembled a child could be used
instead. 3
Applying the Miller standard to child pornography was insuffi-
cient, according to the Court.' Thus, after Ferber, it is not required
46. 458 U.S. 747, 753 (1982).
47. Id. at 756.
48. Id. at 756-57.
49. Id. at 758.
50. Id. at 759.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 761.
53. Id. at 762-63.
54. See id. at 764.
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that material alleged to be child pornography appeal to the prurient
interest of the average person, portray sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, or even that the material be considered as a whole to
be banned.55 The Court imposed some limits, however. The offense
must be "adequately defined by the applicable state law" and
"limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct by children."56
In addition, "[the category of 'sexual conduct' proscribed must ... be
suitably limited and described."57 Finally, the statute must include
some form of scienter as a requirement. 58
5. Possession of Child Pornography: Osborne v. Ohio
Eight years after the Ferber decision upheld a ban on dissemina-
tion of child pornography, and twenty-one years after Stanley held
that mere possession of obscene materials was not illegal, the Court
in Osborne v. Ohio considered whether a state could ban the mere
possession of child pornography.59 Although the Court in Stanley
found that privacy interests outweighed the interests of the state
when it came to possession of general obscene materials, the same
was not true when it came to possession of child pornography. The
Court reasoned that the state interest in banning possession of child
pornography "far exceed[ed]" the state interests identified in
Stanley, and upheld that portion of the Ohio statute.6 °
The primary reason for the statute in Stanley, the Court ob-
served, was a paternalistic concern that "obscenity would poison the
minds of its viewers."6 ' The state's concern in Osborne, however, was
quite different: the protection of children who were the victims of
the production of child pornography.62
The Court relied heavily on its decision in Ferber, reiterating that
states have a compelling interest in protecting children's physical
and psychological well-being.' The Court agreed that going after
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 765.
59. 495 U.S. 103, 108 (1990).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 109.
62. Id.
63. See id.
[Vol. 47:21292138
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only the production and dissemination of child pornography was
insufficient to eliminate its existence." The Court also supported its
holding by finding that the continued existence of pornographic
material involving a child "causes the child victims continuing harm
by haunting the children in years to come," and that proscribing
possession of such materials under pain of criminal sanction was an
effective way of encouraging possessors to destroy it. 5 Finally, the
Court stated that because pedophiles use child pornography to
seduce children into engaging in sexual activity, the state had an
interest in encouraging its destruction."
II. THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION ACT OF 1996
Concerned with the development of technology that conceivably
could be used to disguise the identity of a child depicted in a
pornographic image and its potentially negative effect on child
pornography prosecutions, on September 30, 1996, Congress passed
the CPPA to redefine what constituted child pornography.67 In its
findings accompanying the CPPA, Congress noted the traditional
rationale for the prohibition of images of children engaged in
sexually explicit conduct-those noted by the Court in Ferber."
Congress also found that emerging technological advances in
computer imaging software made it possible to create images of
nonexistent children "that are virtually indistinguishable to the
unsuspecting viewer" from images of actual children.69 In addition,
such software could be used to edit existing images of children to
make them appear to be engaging in sexually explicit conduct or
manipulate them to the point that it would be "virtually impossible"
64. Id. at 110.
65. Id. at 111.
66. Id.
67. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 to -32 (1996).
68. See id. § 121(1)(1)-(4), 110 Stat. at 3009-26 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251
(2000)) (finding, inter alia, that the "use of children in the production of sexually explicit
material ... is a form of sexual abuse which can result in physical or psychological harm, or
both, to the children involved"; that the "continued existence [of child pornography] causes the
child victims of sexual abuse continuing harm by haunting those children in future years";
that "child pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing other children into
sexual activity"; and that "child pornography is often used by pedophiles and child sexual
abusers to stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites").
69. Id. § 121(1)(5), 110 Stat. at 3009-26.
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to determine whether real children were used in its creation, and if
so, to identify them.7 ° Congress also believed that the same links
between child pornography and sexual abuse existed with this so-
called "virtual" child pornography. 1
With these findings, Congress redefined the meaning of child
pornography to address the concerns with this emerging field of
virtual child pornography. Breaking no new ground, the CPPA
defined child pornography to include those images produced using
real children engaged in sexually explicit conductY.7 The law also
extended the definition of child pornography to include virtual child
pornography, or images that were, or appeared to be, "of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct."73 In addition, the statute
included a morphing provision, which meant that an image that was
created or edited such that it appeared to be of an identifiable child
engaged in sexually explicit conduct was also included in the
definition of child pornography. 4 Finally, in what can be described
as a pandering provision, the statute included in the definition of
child pornography any image that was "advertised, promoted,
presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys
the impression" that it was child pornography. 5
III. ASHCROFT V. FREE SPEECH COALITION
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court con-
fronted the question of whether the definition of child pornography
under the CPPA was constitutional, and it identified from the outset
that the proscription at issue-sexually explicit images of children
that appear to be but are not real children-was a step beyond what
had been found to be constitutionally proscribable in Ferber.76 The
CPPA sought, as did the statute at issue in Ferber, to prohibit
images that were not necessarily obscene under the Miller
standard.7 7 Yet, unlike the statute in Ferber, the CPPA did not
70. Id. § 121(1)(6)(A), 110 Stat. at 3009-26.
71. Id. § 121(1)(8), 110 Stat. at 3009-26 to -27.
72. Id. § 121(2)(4), 110 Stat. at 3009-27 to -28 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2000)).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002).
77. Id.
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confine its prohibition to only depictions of real children.7" Thus, the
Court was presented with the issue of whether material that was
neither obscene nor child pornography (as strictly defined by Ferber)
could be constitutionally proscribed.79
Two of the four provisions defining pornography in the CPPA0
were at issue in Free Speech Coalition. Specifically, the Court
addressed the virtual image provision, which proscribed any "visual
depiction [that] is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct,"8 ' and the pandering provision, which proscribed
any visual depiction "that conveys the impression that the material
is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct."82 Not challenged in the case was the morphing
provision of the statute, which defined child pornography to include
images edited to appear as if an identifiable child was engaged in
sexually explicit conduct.8 3 Also not challenged was the proscription
of those images of identifiable children engaged in sexually explicit
conduct, which is allowed under Ferber. Neither of these provisions
were at issue, as the statute's challengers-including an adult-
entertainment industry trade association-alleged that only the
virtual image and pandering provisions were "overbroad and
vague, chilling them from producing works protected by the First
Amendment.""
The Court at the outset noted that although "Congress may pass
valid laws to protect children from abuse, .... [t]he prospect of crime
... by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected speech."85 The
Court then observed that the statute prohibited "images that
appear[ed] to depict a minor engaging in sexually explicit activity
without regard to the Miller [obscenity] requirements."' The statute
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The four provisions were (1) the "real child" provision, (2) the "virtual child" provision,
(3) the "morphing" provision, and (4) the "pandering" provision. See discussion supra Part II.
81. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121(2)(4), 110 Stat.
3009, 3009-28 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000)), invalidated by Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
82. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000)), repealed by PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No.
108-21, § 502(a)(3), 117 Stat. 650, 678 (2003).
83. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 242.
84. Id. at 243.
85. Id. at 245.
86. Id. at 246.
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merely prohibited "images ... so long as the persons appear to be
under 18 years of age." 7
Indeed, the Court noted that the "prohibition on 'any visual
depiction' does not depend at all on how the image [was]
produced."" Thus, the statute brought within its terms Renaissance
paintings and Hollywood films (without child actors) if a jury found
that they depicted what "'appear[ed] to be ... a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.'"89
The Court first dealt with the government's argument that virtual
child pornography may be used to seduce children. Citing Congress's
finding that pedophiles could seduce children into sexual activity
with material depicting virtual images of children just as effectively
as they could using material depicting real children, the government
argued that "protecting minors against such abuse is just as
compelling as the government's interest in preventing minors from
being used in the production of child pornography."9" The Court
dismissed the argument, however, finding that "many things
innocent in themselves ... might be used for immoral purposes," but
that it would not be permissible for the government to prohibit them
merely because they could be misused.9'
In addition, the Court stressed that the government has other
means of prohibiting such conduct without infringing on protected
First Amendment liberties.92 Those means include providing
criminal sanctions for adults who "provide unsuitable materials to
children," and criminal solicitation.93 The Court, therefore, con-
cluded that, as to this argument, the statute was overbroad because
it sought to criminalize possession of materials based on conduct
that was not linked to the speech at issue.
The Court then focused on the government's argument that
virtual child pornography "whets the appetites of pedophiles and
87. Id. at 247.
88. Id. at 241 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000)).
89. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000)).
90. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 12, Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (No. 00-
795), 2001 WL 965533.
91. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 251.
92. See id. at 251-52.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 252.
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encourages them to engage in illegal conduct."95 "The government,"
said the Court, "may not prohibit speech because it increases the
chance an unlawful act will be committed 'at some indefinite future
time.'"96 Although Brandenburg v. Ohio allows the government to
limit speech that is directed to inciting criminal conduct,97 here,
there was no direct connection between the speech and the prohib-
ited conduct, only a remote connection "between speech that might
encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse."98
Next, the Court addressed the government's argument that to
eliminate "the market for pornography produced using real chil-
dren" it is also necessary to prohibit virtual images.9 The govern-
ment's argument seemingly appealed to the Court's second rationale
in Ferber-namely that the "most expeditious if not the only
practical method of law enforcement [to end the sexual abuse of
children] may be to dry up the market for [child pornography] by
imposing severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising,
or otherwise promoting the product."'00 To the Court, however, this
argument was logically unsound: "If virtual images were identical
to illegal child pornography, the illegal images would be driven from
the market by the indistinguishable substitutes. Few pornographers
would risk prosecution by abusing real children if fictional, comput-
erized images would suffice." 10'
The government's fourth argument was the possibility that
without the statute, those guilty of possessing images of real
children could be found innocent because the government would be
unable to prove that the images were of real children.0 2 The
government argued that because some virtual images of children
are so similar to real children, it would be impossible to prove that
images are of real children unless they "match the depictions to
pictures in pornographic magazines produced before the develop-
ment of computer imaging software or ... establish the identity of
95. Id. at 253.
96. Id. (quoting Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973)).
97. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); see also supra note 20.
98. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 253.
99. Id. at 254.
100. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760 (1982).
101. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 254.
102. Id.
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the victim." °3 The Court immediately rejected the argument,
finding that, in essence, it stated little more than that the solution
to the problem of being unable to distinguish between images of real
and virtual children was to prohibit both, which is tantamount to
arguing "that protected speech may be banned as a means to
ban[ning] unprotected speech."0 4 This, to the Court, "turn[ed] the
First Amendment upside down."' °
Finally, the Court addressed the argument that the affirmative
defenses provided under the CPPA were sufficient to alleviate any
infirmities the statute otherwise possessed.0 6 Noting in dicta that
it was unsure whether the government could impose upon a
defendant "the burden of proving his speech is not unlawful," or, in
other words, that the image depicted an adult rather than a child,
the Court held that it did not matter because the affirmative
defense contained in the CPPA was "incomplete and insufficient."
0 7
The Court stated that under the affirmative defense found in
§ 2252A(c), a movie producer or distributor who possesses virtual
child pornography with the intent to sell it may use the defense, but
a movie producer who merely possesses the same material could
not.1°' Indeed, those charged with possession of child pornography
(without the intent to sell) could not plead that the images depicted
were adults as an affirmative defense, only that they possessed
103. Reply Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 90, at 7-8.
104. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 254-55.
105. Id. at 255.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 255-56. Under the statute as it was considered by the Court, anyone who
knowingly mailed or transported, received or distributed, reproduced for distribution, or sold
or possessed with intent to sell child pornography could be held criminally liable. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a) (2000). It was an affirmative defense if
(1) the alleged child pornography was produced using an actual person or
persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct; (2) each such person was an adult
at the time the material was produced; and (3) the defendant did not advertise,
promote, present, describe, or distribute the material in such a manner as to
convey the impression that it is or contains a visual depiction of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
Id. § 2252A(c). Moreover, a person charged with mere possession of child pornography under
§ 2252A(a)(5) had an affirmative defense if the defendant possessed fewer than three images,
promptly destroyed each image while not retaining or allowing access to an image other than
to law enforcement, and reported it to law enforcement. Id. § 2252A(d).
108. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 256.
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fewer than three images of child pornography. °9 An even larger
hole in the defense, the Court found, was that there was no defense
available if the image in question was entirely computer generated
rather than created with adults who appear to be children."0 The
Court concluded, therefore, that the affirmative defense failed to
save the statute because it left "unprotected a substantial amount
of speech not tied to the Government's interest in distinguishing
images produced using real children from virtual ones.""'
The Court then turned to the pandering provision of the statute.
Under the provision, the definition of child pornography included
any image "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distrib-
uted in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material
is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct."" 2 Defined in such a manner, the determination
of whether the material was child pornography turned on "how the
speech [was] presented, not on what [was] depicted.""' Although the
Court noted that whether an image pandered to be sexually explicit
may be relevant in determining whether it is obscene, it is not
conclusive as to whether the image is in fact obscene or porno-
graphic." 4
Additionally, the Court found the pandering provision to be
overbroad. The Court concluded that the way the provision was
written, possessors, not just the producers and distributors, of
materials advertised or promoted as child pornography were subject
to criminal prosecution under the statute even though the possessor
of the material had no control over its advertising or promotion and
even though the content of the material was not pornographic."'
Not only would the statute punish those possessors for "bad
thoughts" for possessing material advertised as child pornography
and for possessing material that was "placed in a box suggesting a
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(d). For a description of the affirmative defense, see supra note
107.
110. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 256.
111. Id.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000) (emphasis added), repealed by PROTECT Act, Pub. L.
No. 108-21, § 502(a)(3), 117 Stat. 650, 678 (2003).
113. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 257.
114. See id. at 257-58.
115. Id. at 258.
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prohibited movie," but also for possessing material "even when the
possessor knows the movie was mislabeled.
" 116
In the end, the Court was most concerned that the government
was overreaching by attempting to proscribe a wide range of
expression on the basis of whether certain individuals associated
that material with thoughts of criminal conduct."17 Citing Stanley v.
Georgia, the Court noted that the government "'cannot constitution-
ally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's
private thoughts.'""' 8 Further, by prohibiting more than just
pornography produced using real children, the statute extended
beyond the specially recognized rationale for proscribing child
pornography under Ferber."9 Ultimately, the Court could not accept
such an extension.
Five justices joined the majority opinion of the Court. Justice
O'Connor concurred in the judgment of the Court that the pandering
provision of the CPPA was overbroad and not narrowly tailored to
the government's purported interest."12 Justice O'Connor also agreed
with the majority that the government may not proscribe content
that appeared to be children engaged in sexually explicit conduct
but is produced with adults.' 2 ' Justice O'Connor dissented from
the majority, however, on the CPPA's ban of purely virtual child
pornography, finding a compelling governmental interest in
protecting children from pedophiles whose sexual appetites could be
spurred by such material or who could use the material to seduce
children.'22
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment of the Court on all
issues, but reserved the opportunity to revisit the issue if technology
advanced to the point "where it becomes impossible to enforce actual
child pornography laws because the Government cannot prove that
116. Id.
117. See id. at 245.
118. Id. at 253 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969)).
119. Id. at 240.
120. Id. at 262 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
121. See id.
122. Id. at 263. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined this section of Justice
O'Connor's opinion in dissent. Chief Justice Rehnquist also filed a separate dissenting opinion
joined by Justices Scalia and O'Connor (in part), arguing that deference should be given to
Congress's determination that technology had advanced to the point of severely impairing
criminal prosecutions for child pornography, as Congress had a compelling interest in the
enforcement of child pornography laws. Id. at 267-68 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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certain pornographic images are of real children." 123 Noting that the
government's argument was based on a possibility that was merely
speculative, Justice Thomas found that if such a situation actually
arose, the government may be able to pass a similar proscription
containing "an appropriate affirmative defense or some other
narrowly drawn restriction."124
IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO ASHCROFT V. FREE SPEECH
COALITION: THE PROTECT ACT OF 2003
Although many have argued that the Court made the wrong
decision in Free Speech Coalition or that the decision would lead to
disastrous results, 2 ' the Court made the correct decision. Congress
overreached by trying to equalize child pornography and virtual
child pornography and failed to recognize the importance of a real
child victim in the production of child pornography that originally
led the Court to uphold a ban on such material in Ferber. By
focusing the child pornography provisions of the PROTECT
Act-Congress's response to Free Speech Coalition-on images of
real children and by prohibiting virtual images under an obscenity
offense, Congress has come close to providing for the elimination of
the same material sought to be proscribed by the CPPA without the
constitutional infirmities found in Free Speech Coalition. The
obscenity offense as it is currently written, however, will not
withstand judicial review because it does not fully employ the
standard of Miller v. California as to virtual images and seeks to
ban mere possession of obscene virtual images contrary to the
Court's holding in Stanley v. Georgia.
123. Id. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Rikki Solowey, Comment, A Question of Equivalence: Expanding the
Definition of Child Pornography To Encompass WVirtual" Computer-Generated Images, 4 TUL.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 161, 175-76 (2002) (arguing that "[1]ifting what was once a strong
deterrent by failing to classify virtual child pornography within the child pornography
definition will only encourage individuals to explore what was previously prohibited").
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A. Congressional Findings
In the congressional findings accompanying the PROTECT Act,
Congress identified its major concerns with the state of the law after
the Supreme Court's decision in Free Speech Coalition. Congress
noted that technology now enabled the manipulation of images of
real children so that they are no longer identifiable or appear
computer generated. 126 Moreover, Congress found that such
technological advances have led those charged with violating
existing child pornography laws to assert that the images they
possess are not of real children and that to be found liable for
possession of child pornography, the government must prove that
the images were not computer-generated children.'27 Because
defendants have raised this issue, prosecutors must "find proof that
the child is real" by specifically identifying either the child depicted
or the origin of the image. 2 ' Moreover, because electronic copies
of images can be altered by repeated transmissions, it is "difficult
for even an expert conclusively to opine that a particular image
depicts a real child."1 29 Because of these difficulties, Congress noted
that there has been a chill on government prosecutions for child
pornography.13°
Thus, Congress concluded that without action, "difficulties in
enforcing the child pornography laws will continue to grow increas-
ingly worse."'3 ' Without amending the law, courts would (if they
had not already) require the government to prove the material
depicted an identifiable child or was not otherwise a "virtual"
child--creating a "reasonable doubt in every case of computer
images even when a real child was abused."'32 Indeed, as the Senate
126. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 501(5), 117 Stat. 650, 676 (2003).
127. Id. § 501(7), 117 Stat. at 677.
128. Id. § 501(9)-(10), 117 Stat. at 677.
129. Id. § 501(8), 117 Stat. at 677.
130. See id. § 501(9), 117 Stat. at 677.
131. Id. § 501(13), 117 Stat. at 678.
132. Id. Several circuits have held, however, that the decision in Free Speech Coalition does
not require the government to present expert witness testimony proving that the subjects in
the images are real children, as juries are still fully capable of determining whether the
subjects in the images are real on the basis of the images alone. See, e.g., United States v.
Farrelly, 389 F.3d 649, 655 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Slanina, 359 F.3d 356,357
(5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)); United States v. Deaton, 328 F.3d 454, 455 (8th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam); United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002).
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Judiciary Committee noted, defendants in some cases following the
Free Speech Coalition decision successfully raised this "virtual porn
defense."'33
B. The Child Pornography Provisions: 18 U.S.C. § 2256 and
§ 2252A
The PROTECT Act revised the definition of child pornography.
The new and altered provisions of§ 2256 and § 2252A are geared at
prohibiting only images of real children and attempt to prevent
individuals from escaping punishment merely by raising claims
that the government failed to prove that the images were not
"virtual." The changes in the definition of child pornography and the
revised affirmative defense work to create a constitutionally sound
rebuttable presumption that should be sufficient for the statute to
survive a facial challenge in the courts.
1. The Revised Definition of Child Pornography of§ 2256
The PROTECT Act amended the definition of child pornography
under § 2256(8)(B) to include any digital image "that is, or is
indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct."'34 Commentators have argued that the change in language
of § 2256(8)(B) from "appears to be" to "indistinguishable from"
makes no difference in the amount of material covered by the
statute. 3 ' The change in language does in fact greatly reduce the
amount of expression that could fall within the ambit of the
statutory definition of child pornography. "Appears to be" can be
defined as something having an "outward aspect."'36 It is synony-
mous with "seeming to be," which can be defined as "giv[ing] the
133. S. REP. No. 108-2, at 4 (2003).
134. § 502(a)(1), 117 Stat. at 678.
135. See, e.g., Kate Dugan, Note, Regulating What's Not Real: Federal Regulation in the
Aftermath ofAshcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1063, 1092 (2004); Jasmin
J. Farhangian, Note,A Problem of"Virtual"Proportions: The Difficulties Inherent in Tailoring
Virtual Child Pornography Laws To Meet Constitutional Standards, 12 J.L. & PoL'Y 241,273
(2003); Ambika J. Biggs, The PROTECT Act and the First Amendment, FIRST AMENDMENT
CENTER, Aug. 27, 2003, http'//www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=l1865.
136. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 60 (11th ed. 2003).
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impression of being."" 7 In contrast, "indistinguishable" as defined
by Congress means that the depiction in the image "is such that an
ordinary person viewing the depiction would conclude that [it] is of
an actual minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct."138 If that
definition was not explicit enough, Congress then made clear that
it did not include "depictions that are drawings, cartoons, sculp-
tures, or paintings depicting minors or adults." 39
Although critics of the PROTECT Act argue that it still has the
effect of sweeping various forms of protected speech under its
proscriptions, this is not the case when, as noted, one critically
analyzes the change in the language between the CPPA and the
PROTECT Act. 140 The "appears to be" language of the CPPA was
broad enough that anything that was similar to the appearance of
a child was included within the definition of child pornography.
Hence, the Supreme Court took notice of the possibility that artistic
works such as productions of Romeo and Juliet, or Academy Award-
winning films such as Traffic and American Beauty could fall under
its purview.' The use of "indistinguishable from" in the PROTECT
Act, however, connotes that the image has no "identifying or
individualizing qualities"' that would make it clear that an image
in question was not that of a real child. Although "indistinguishable
137. Id. at 1124.
138. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(11) (West Supp. 2005).
139. Id.
140. Justice O'Connor, in fact, argued in dissent in Free Speech Coalition that the CPPA
ban on images that "appear[] to be" children engaged in sexually explicit conduct should have
been interpreted more narrowly so as to include only images that were "indistinguishable
from" real children. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 264-65 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). She argued that this was
Congress's intent when it passed the measure, as evidenced by the term's repeated use in the
CPPA's findings of fact. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 69-70. During oral
arguments, the government sought to have the Court construe the statute with this meaning,
despite the plain language of"appears to be" in the operative section of the statute. Transcript
of Oral Argument at 25-27, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (No. 00-795),
2001 WL 1398602. However, the majority rejected this argument and chose instead to
interpret the provision with its plain meaning. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 241. If there
was no difference in meaning between "appears to be" and "indistinguishable from," it seems
unlikely that the Court would take time to point out that by the terms of the CPPA a
Renaissance painting or Hollywood film might be considered child pornography because they
'appear" to depict a child engaging in sexually explicit conduct even when a reasonable person
should be able to conclude that the image is not one of a real child. See id.
141. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 247-48.
142. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 136, at 635.
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from" supposes that one cannot perceive a difference, "appears to
be" suggests that one can, only need not. Thus, the PROTECT Act
has substantially limited the amount of content that falls under the
proscription of § 2256(8)(B). As a result, the change in language
greatly reduces the "chill" on protected speech that the Court found
so troubling in Free Speech Coalition.'
2. The Affirmative Defense of§ 2252A
The affirmative defense provided in the PROTECT Act is an
amended version of the defense considered by the Supreme Court in
Free Speech Coalition. It provides that anyone charged with offenses
under § 2252A(a)(1)-(5)--which include trafficking, possessing with
intent to sell, and mere possession of child pornography-may
assert the affirmative defense if "(1)(A) the alleged child pornogra-
phy was produced using an actual person or persons engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; and (B) each such person was an adult at
the time the material was produced; or (2) the alleged child
pornography was not produced using any actual minor or minors."'"
The pre-Free Speech Coalition version provided a defense only if the
alleged child pornography was produced with an adult. 4 ' Thus,
because the provision now includes a defense if the image was not
produced with a child, the statute no longer prohibits virtual child
pornography, something that was not the case in Free Speech
Coalition.'46 Its aim is purely at pornographic images of real
children.
Although the amendment to the definition of child pornography
substantially reduces the amount of protected material that would
be subject to the statute, this reconstituted affirmative defense
should cure any defect remaining in the amended definition. The
Supreme Court noted in dicta in Free Speech Coalition that it was
unsure whether the government could place the burden on a
defendant to prove that material alleged to be child pornography
143. See infra text accompanying note 189.
144. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(c) (West Supp. 2005).
145. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2000).
146. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 242 (finding that "[to] ensure that defendants
possessing child pornography using real minors cannot evade prosecution, Congress extended
the ban to virtual child pornography").
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was not such because "[w]here the defendant is not the producer of
the work, he may have no way of establishing the identity, or even
the existence, of the actors." 47 The Court did not fully address the
issue, however, and summarily found that whether the government
could impose a burden on the defendant did not matter in the
instant case because the affirmative defense as it was then written
was "incomplete and insufficient" on its face.1' s
a. Interpreting the Affirmative Defense as a Constitutionally
Sound Rebuttable Presumption
In analyzing whether Congress can shift any burden to the
defendant consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, this Note begins by noting two
important constitutional principles. It is axiomatic that the Due
Process Clause requires the state to prove each element of a
criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.'49 In addition, if one
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems
whereas another acceptable construction would not, the statute
should be construed so as not to raise those problems unless that
construction "is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." 5 ° Thus,
147. Id. at 255.
148. Id. at 256. The concurring opinions offer little additional guidance on what would
constitute a "complete" affirmative defense. In a brief concurrence, Justice Thomas wrote only
that the majority left 'open the possibility that a more complete affirmative defense could
save a statute's constitutionality, implicitly accepting that some regulation of virtual child
pornography might be constitutional." Id. at 259-60 (citation omitted) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Thomas went on to say that he "would not prejudge ... whether a more
complete affirmative defense is the only way to narrowly tailor a criminal statute that
prohibits the possession and dissemination of virtual child pornography." Id. at 260. Justice
O'Connor, meanwhile, did not address the affirmative defense issue at all.
149. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970) ("Due process commands that no man
shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of ... convincing the
factfinder of his guilt." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
150. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988). The Court noted further that the
'elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in
order to save a statute from unconstitutionality." This approach not only reflects
the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted,
but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an
oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume
that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp
power constitutionally forbidden it.
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a statute should be construed to save it from constitutional
infirmities under the Due Process Clause if such a construction is
possible and is not at odds with congressional will.
Despite the nomenclature given to it by Congress, § 2252A(c) is
not really an affirmative defense at all. A true affirmative defense
is one in which the defendant admits to committing the act in
question, but argues that he should be excused from punishment;
self-defense and insanity are examples.15' Such is not the case with
§ 2252A(c), however, as a person pleading the defense does not
admit to any conduct that would be illegal but for the defense.
Rather, the person asserting it is arguing that the government has
failed to prove that the sexually explicit material in question is
proscribed because the imagery contained therein is not that of a
real child.
The Supreme Court has noted that although the government is
not constitutionally required to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt
the elements of an affirmative defense once raised by a defendant,
there are constitutional limits to what a legislature may fairly
term an affirmative defense such that it may not reallocate the
burden of proving (or disproving) the elements of an offense onto a
defendant. 52 Thus, a defendant charged under § 2252A constitution-
ally cannot be required to prove his own innocence merely through
the creation of an affirmative defense. Noting the canon of
construction that a statute should be construed so as not to raise
constitutional problems when not plainly at odds with congressio-
nal intent,13 the definition of child pornography provided by
§ 2256(8)(B) as any image that is "indistinguishable from" a real
child combined with the affirmative defense of § 2252A(c) should be
read to create a rebuttable presumption. This conclusion is bolstered
by the definition given the term "indistinguishable" in the statute:
the term means "that the depiction is such that an ordinary person
viewing the depiction would conclude that the depiction is of an
Id. (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)).
151. See, e.g., People v. Huckleberry, 768 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) ("[A]n
affirmative defense basically admits the doing of the act charged, but seeks to justify, excuse
or mitigate it."), cited in Stephen Michael Everhart, Putting a Burden of Production on the
Defendant Before Admitting Evidence that Someone Else Committed the Crime Charged: Is It
Constitutional?, 76 NEB. L. REV. 272, 292 n.93 (1997).
152. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
153. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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actual minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct." 54 Thus, if the
factfinder determines that an image is indistinguishable from that
of a real child, the factfinder may conclude that it is a real child. The
affirmative defense allows the-defendant to rebut this presumption.
In County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, the cardinal case on
rebuttable presumptions in criminal statutes, the Supreme Court
recognized that "[ilnferences and- presumptions are' a staple of our
adversary system of factfinding."'55 Such devices are constitutional
however, only if they do not "undermine the factfinder's responsibil-
ity at trial, -based on evidence adduced by the State; to find the
ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt."56
The Court in Ulster defined two types of presumptions: permis-
sive and mandatory.'57 A permissive presumption is one that
"allows-but does not require-the trier of fact to infer the elemen
tal fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which
places no burden of any kind on the defendant." 5 '. Because the
factfinder may freely reject a permissive-presumption and because
it therefore does not automatically shift any part of the burden of
proof to the defendant, a party challenging it must "demonstrate its
invalidity as applied to him". because the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard of proof is affected only if "there is no rational way
the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference."'59
A mandatory presumption, on the other hand, "tells the trier [of
fact] that he or they must find the elemental fact upon proof of the
basic fact, at least unless the defendant has come forward With some
evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts."'
60
Moreover, mandatory presumptions can be divided further into two
classes: those :that "merely shift the burden of production to the
defendant, following the satisfaction of which the ultimate burden
of persuasion returns to the prosecution," and those that shift the
entire, burden of proof to the defendant-including the burdens of
production and persuasion.1
61
154. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(11) (West Supp. 2005).
155. 442 U.S. 140, 156.(1979).
156. Id.
157. See id. at 157 ...
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 157 n.16.
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The rebuttable presumption created by the PROTECT Act should
be construed to be of the former class-a mandatory presumption
that shifts only the burden of production.162 The statute makes no
mention of the burden placed on the defendant in raising the
"affirmative defense."163 Moreover, the legislative history is equally
ambiguous, stating only that the "affirmative defense" serves to
"absolve defendants from liability upon a showing that the depic-
tions in question were not made by using actual children."1 64 The
legislative history also notes that "like other affirmative defenses ....
this provision places the burden of proof' on the defendant.165
"Burden of proof," however, is a loaded term that can mean either
the burden of production or the burden of persuasion..166 Indeed,
the legislative history compares the "affirmative defense" of
§ 2252(c) with other affirmative defenses; including self-defense and
insanity.167 If the "affirmative defense" of § 2252(c) is comparable to
self-defense, then it should be noted that a majority of states shift
only the burden of production to the defendant, requiring simply
that a criminal defendant produce enough credible evidence to raise
a reasonable doubt as to whether he acted in self-defense, and leave
the burden of persuasion to disprove the affirmative defense once
it is raised on the government. 6  The same is true in federal
. 162. Because the presumption scheme employed by the PROTECT Act as interpreted by
this Note requires the factfinder to determine that the image is of a real child if it is
indistinguishable from a real child and because the scheme places at least some burden on
the defendant, the author concedes that the presumption scheme employed is not an entirely
permissive presumption. See supra text accompanying notes 157-59.
163. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (stating only that "[ilt shall be
an affirmative defense" the elements of the affirmative defense exist).
164. S. REP. No. 108-2, at 7 (2003) (emphasis added).
165. See id. at 8.
166. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N..BoYCE,-CRIMINAL LAw 78 (3d ed. 1982).
167. See S. REP. No. 108-2, at 8.
168. See, e.g., Pounders v. State, 213 So. 2d 394, 395 (Ala. 1968); State v. Garcia, 560 P.2d
1224, 1227 (Ariz. 1977); People v. Cornett, 198 P.2d 877, 883 (Cal. 1948); Leonard v. People,
369 P.2d 54, 61 (Colo. 1962); Fetters v. State, 436 A.2d 796, 797 (Del. 1981); Lane v. State, 32
So. 896,899 (Fla. 1902); People v.,Warren, 210 N.E.2d 507, 509-10 (Ill. 1965); State v. Brown,
640 So. 2d 488, 491 (La. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Millett, 273 A.2d 504, 507-08 (Me. 1971);
State v. Evans, 362 A.2d 629, 635 (Md. 1976); State v. Graham, 371 N.W.2d 204, 209 (Minn.
1985); Bell v. State, 42 So. 2d 728, 732 (Miss. 1949); State v. Holt, 434 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Mo.
1968); State v. Halk, 141 P. 149, 150 (Mont. 1914); State v. Gardner, 242 A.2d 1, 6-7 (N.J.
1968); State v. Parish, 878 P.2d 988, 993-94 (N.M. 1994); State v. Boone, 263 S.E.2d 758, 761
(N.C. 1980); State v. Hazlett, 113 N.W. 374, 376 (N.D. 1907); State v. Melchior, 381 N.E.2d
195, 199 (Ohio 1978); Cottrell v. State, 458 P.2d 328, 333-34 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969);
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cases. 6 9 On the other hand, as to insanity, the federal government
places the burden on the defendant to prove the affirmative defense
by "clear and convincing evidence." 170 Additionally, although a
minority of states may require a greater showing by the defendant
in raising self-defense, the varying standards in the self-defense
context-as well as between the examples cited in the legislative
history of the PROTECT Act-further highlight the ambiguity in
determining congressional intent on the extent of the burden to
be placed on a defendant asserting the "affirmative defense" of
§ 2252A(c).
As such, to assure its constitutionality, the section should be
interpreted to require the defendant only to produce credible
evidence that the material in question is not that of a real child such
that a reasonable doubt is raised in the mind of the factfinder.
171
Once the defendant produces this credible evidence, the burden
would shift back to the government to refute the evidence, with the
burden of persuasion as to whether the image is that of a real child
remaining on the government throughout. 172 Such an interpretation
Commonwealth v. Black, 376 A.2d 627, 630 (Pa. 1977); In re Doe, 390 A.2d 920, 926 (R.I.
1978); State v. Reddington, 125 N.W.2d 58, 61 (S.D. 1963); Torres v. State, 751 S.W.2d 705,
707 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Utz v. Commonwealth, 505 S.E.2d 380, 382 (Va. Ct. App. 1998);
State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 504 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
169. See United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 842 n.12 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that "[i]n
a federal prosecution, ... once a defendant has met the burden of production, the government
must satisfy the burden of persuasion and must negate self-defense beyond a reasonable
doubt").
170. 18 U.S.C. § 17(b) (2000). Notably, unlike § 2252A(c) in which it was silent, in § 17(b),
Congress clearly expressed the precise burden of proof to be placed on a defendant who raises
insanity as a defense in federal cases.
171. In so concluding, it should be reiterated that Congress devised the "indistinguishable
from" definition/affirmative defense scheme because it wanted to ensure that prosecution of
an offender was possible where there is a real child depicted in the material but who is not
readily identifiable, relying on the depictions themselves to prove that the image is of a real
child. See S. REP. No. 108-2, at 4; discussion supra Part IV.A.
172. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 230-31 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell noted that
even as to those factors upon which the prosecution must bear the burden of
persuasion, the State retains an important procedural device to avoid jury
confusion and prevent the prosecution from being unduly hampered. The State
normally may shift to the defendant the burden of production, that is, the
burden of going forward with sufficient evidence "to justify (a reasonable) doubt
upon the issue." If the defendant's evidence does not cross this threshold, the
issue be it malice, extreme emotional disturbance, self-defense, or whatever will
not be submitted to the jury.... [Flederal prosecutors have borne the burden of
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of the rebuttable presumption scheme remains consistent with the
ambiguous language of the statute and is not plainly at odds with
congressional intent.
Such an interpretation also makes the mandatory rebuttable
presumption created by the statute more analogous to a permissive
presumption as well because the burden of production is so low. 173
Moreover, unlike constitutionally suspect mandatory presumptions,
the presumption here is not "divorced from [the] facts," as the
factfinder is entitled to review all of the evidence. 174 The factfinder
may convict a defendant only if the material in question is so
indistinguishable from a real child that the factfinder can not
perceive the difference and by inference can reasonably conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that the material is that of a real child. 7 '
As such, the affirmative defense of § 2252(c) in combination with the
definition of child pornography in § 2256(8) should be construed as
a constitutionally sound rebuttable presumption.
b. A "Complete and Sufficient" Affirmative Defense and the
Ability To Meet Its Burden of Production
Having determined that Congress has created a constitutionally
permissible rebuttable presumption scheme in § 2252A and § 2256,
the questions that now arise are whether it is possible for a
defendant to produce credible evidence to satisfy the affirmative
defense and whether Congress has adequately addressed the Court's
concern that the affirmative defense as it was written under CPPA
was "incomplete and insufficient" on its face. 76 The Court in Free
Speech Coalition questioned whether a distributor further down the
distribution chain would have an easier time proving that the child
persuasion with respect to factors like insanity, self-defense, and malice or
provocation, once the defendant has carried this burden of production.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 cmt. at 110 (Tentative Draft No.
4, 1955)).
173. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 n.16 (1979) ("To the extent that a
presumption imposes an extremely low burden of production ... it may well be that its impact
is no greater than that of a permissive inference, and it may be proper to analyze it as such.").
174. Id. at 159.
175. See supra notes 142-43, 154 and accompanying text.
176. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002).
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depicted in the image in question was an adult.177 Presumably, a
similar argument could be made against the current statute in that
a distributor would have trouble proving the image was not of a
minor. 17 Section 2257, however, seems to discount this worry. It
imposes on anyone who produces sexually explicit materials the
obligation to maintain records on the identities of subjects of their
work to ensure that they are not minors. 179 Those further down the
distribution chain should not have significant trouble producing the
requisite information to use the affirmative defense because § 2257
requires distributors to ensure that affixed to any sexually explicit
imagery is a notice of the information that the section requires
producers to collect. 8 ' If a distributor complies with § 2257 and
ensures that such a notice is affixed to any sexually explicit imagery
that she sells or distributes, it would serve as credible proof that the
image was not that of a child as required by the affirmative
defense.'
Moreover, the reconstituted affirmative defense in the PROTECT
Act also allows mere possessors charged under § .2252A(a)(5) to
assert the defense that the sexually explicit images for which they
177. Id. at 255-56.
178. As Ambika J. Biggs argues, "If law enforcement agents have a hard time finding those
depicted in -the images to prove they are under-age, then an individual accused only of
possession of such images also may be unable to find the actors to prove they are of legal age."
Biggs, supra note 135.
179. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2257 (West 2000 & Supp. 2005). Piior to passage of the PROTECT Act,
§ 2257 defined "produces" to include the production of"any book, magazine, periodical, film,
video tape or other similar matter." 18 U.S.C. § 2257(h)(3)•(2000). The section was modified
by the PROTECTAct to include explicitly within that definition the production of a "computer
generated image, digital image, or picture." 18 U.S.C.A. § 2257(h)(3) (West Supp. 2005).
180. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(f)(4) (2000).
181. That said, § 2257 only requires documentation on imagery produced after November
1, 1990. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(a)(1) (2000). In Free Speech Coalition, Justice Kennedy expressed
concern on behalf of the majority that the CPPA applied to sexually explicit images prior to
its 1996 enactment, a time in which distributors would not have been placed on notice that
they would need to preserve records sufficient to show that images of alleged child
pornography were created using adults. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 256. By complying with
§ 2257, however, distributors will at least have documentation as far back as 1990. Moreover,
there is no serious suggestion that technology was advanced sufficiently prior to 1990 to
create virtual child pornography indistinguishable from that of real child pornography. Thus,
the traditional methods of establishing whether the person depicted in a sexually explicit
image is an adult (e.g., opinion by an expert in child development) should be adequate for
material created during that period.
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are charged were not created with actual children. 82 The CPPA
allowed a mere possessor to assert an affirmative defense only if she
possessed fewer than three sexually explicit images of children,
notified authorities, and subsequently destroyed the images." 3 The
Court in Free Speech Coalition was clearly concerned that the CPPA
failed to allow a defendant to defend herself on the ground that no
children were used in the production of the sexually explicit
material even if she were able to do so.'" Because the PROTECT
Act allows a defendant to assert that the image is not of a real child,
it effectively answers the Court's chief concern in Free Speech
Coalition that the affirmative defense was "incomplete and insuffi-
cient" on its face. 8 5
There is a legitimate argument that possessors and distributors
far removed from the producers of sexually explicit material may
have a more difficult time asserting the affirmative defense.'86 By
complying with § 2257 (affixing to any sexually explicit imagery a
notice of the information that the section requires producers to
collect), however, distributors should have practically no problem in
complying with the burden of the affirmative defense. Moreover,
there is no reason to believe that possessors should have a more
difficult time because the necessary information should be available
from the publisher of the book, magazine, or video in question if
that publisher complied with § 2257 in collecting the requisite
information and the distributor complied by ensuring that notice
was affixed to the imagery.8 7 There is little argument that a person
could be mistaken that possession of child pornography was not
182. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502(d), 117 Stat. 650, 678-80 (2003) (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)).
183. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(d) (2000). This provision is still good law, thus allowing a mere
possessor to assert either the defense in subparagraph (c) or (d).
184. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 256.
185. See id.; see also supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Letter from Laura W. Murphy and Marvin J. Johnson, Am. Civil Liberties
Union, to Senator Patrick J. Leahy (Feb. 5, 2003), in S. REP. No. 108-2, at 33 (2003) (arguing
that "[niormally, only the producer of the material will be in aposition to meet the burden and
proof," but that "[slubsequent possessors or distributors are unlikely to have the records to
meet that burden").
187. By citing the provisions of § 2257 as a means of invoking the affirmative defense of §
2252(c), the author does not mean to imply that it is the only method of raising the affirmative
defense, only that it is but one, and perhaps the most efficient, example of how a defendant
may meet the burden of production.
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against the law.' 8 That possession of child pornography has been
proscribed is well known and long established. Because a would-be
possessor should know that possession of child pornography
produced using real children puts her at risk of criminal sanctions,
it does not seem too harsh a burden to expect her to ensure that a
§ 2257 notice is included with material she acquires. The possessor
can then use the notice to raise the § 2252A affirmative defense.
3. Surviving a Facial Constitutional Challenge
In Free Speech Coalition, the Court noted that the CPPA was
unconstitutional on its face because "it prohibit[ed] a substantial
amount of protected expression," and with its "severe penalties ...
few legitimate movie producers or book publishers, or few other
speakers in any capacity, would risk distributing images in or near
the uncertain reach of [the CPPAI."189 Those who argue that the
PROTECT Act also is unconstitutional seem to do so based on the
assumption that any infringement on protected expression is
enough to sustain a facial challenge to the statute. 90 As the Court
in Broadrick v. Oklahoma made clear, however, "facial overbreadth
adjudication is an exception" and,
188. Contra, e.g., United States v. Mancuso, 420 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970). In Mancuso, the
court held that the defendant could not be convicted under a statute requiring him to fill out
registration forms before entering or leaving the country after having been convicted of
federal narcotics laws by reasoning that '[wihen there is no knowledge of the law's provisions,
and no reasonable probability that knowledge might be obtained, no useful end is served by
prosecuting the 'violators.'" Id. at 559. The court noted that the problem was the "sloppiness
on the part of those charged with responsibility for enforcing the statute," a problem that the
court noted could have been corrected by posting signs in the entrances of the airport or by
putting a notice on passport applications. Id. Unlike Mancuso, the proscription of possession
of child pornography is a cause celebre, an issue that is widely discussed and triggers
immediate and extensive news coverage when a person is charged with the offense.
189. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 244.
190. Although this may be a mischaracterization in that critics of the PROTECT Act may
more accurately be described as seeing no difference in the use of the language 'appears to
be" and "indistinguishable from" and, to that end, see no reason why the revised definition of
child pornography under the PROTECT Act should survive judicial scrutiny any more than
the definition under the CPPA. But as has been noted, the change in language substantially
reduces the amount of material that falls under the statute's proscription. See discussion
supra Part IV.B.1.
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[alithough ... laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected
speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that
effect-at best a prediction-cannot, with confidence, justify
invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from
enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within
its power to proscribe.191
The test is whether the overbreadth of a statute is real and
substantial when "judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep.""' If there is less-than-substantial overbreadth,
the constitutionality of the provision is to be determined as applied
to the specific case at hand.'93
Although it is conceivable that in some rare case, the PROTECT
Act may make illegal some otherwise protected form of expression,
the Act clearly is not impermissibly overbroad under the Broadrick
test because its overbreadth is not substantial. As noted above,
because of the change made to the definition of child pornography
from "appears to be" to "indistinguishable from" in § 2252A, the
amount of material proscribed by the statute is substantially
limited.' 9 In those instances in which an image is found to be
indistinguishable from an image of a real child, the affirmative
defense provided for by the Act is sufficient to ensure that defen-
dants are adequately protected.'95 Moreover, in the even rarer case
that an image is found to be indistinguishable from that of a real
child and the affirmative defense does not protect the accused, a
court may still find that the statute as applied to the accused is
unconstitutional, leaving it intact as to its legitimate applications. '96
191. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). Indeed, Justice O'Connor in Free
Speech Coalition believed that invalidating the CPPA on its face was too severe a remedy and
instead argued that the appropriate result was to "strike down the prohibition of pornography
that 'appears to be' of minors only insofar as it is applied to the class of youthful adult
pornography." Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
192. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
193. See id. at 615-16.
194. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
195. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
196. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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C. The Obscenity Offense: § 1466A
Recognizing that virtual child pornography cannot be constitu-
tionally proscribed as pornography, some have argued that the more
effective method of dealing with such material is to seek its
elimination under the umbrella of obscenity regulations.'97 Even the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children has concluded
that
the vast majority (99-100%) of all child pornography would be
found to be obscene by most judges and juries, even under the
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. Even
within the reasonable person under community standards
model, it is highly unlikely that any community would not find
child pornography obscene.'98
Further, the Supreme Court gave hints that it might be accept-
able to create an obscenity statute in which the apparent age of the
individual depicted was a factor in whether the image offended
community standards.' 99 In so theorizing, the Court noted that
"[plictures of young children engaged in certain acts might be
obscene where similar depictions of adults, or perhaps even older
adolescents, would not."200 The Court reiterated, however, that to
survive a constitutional challenge, such a statute must comply with
the three-pronged Miller standard: "the Government must prove
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, is
patently offensive in light of community standards, and lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."20 '
With this in mind, Congress included § 1466A in the PROTECT
Act as a means of proscribing obscene visual depictions of the sexual
197. See Aimee G. Hamoy, Comment, The Constitutionality of Virtual Child Pornography:
Why Reality and Fantasy Are Still Different Under the First Amendment, 12 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 471, 512 (2002); Ryan P. Kennedy, Note, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Can
We Roast the Pig Without Burning Down the House in Regulating "Virtual" Child
Pornography?, 37 AKRON L. REv. 379, 411 (2004).
198. Letter from Daniel Armagh, Natl Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, to Senator
Patrick J. Leahy (Oct. 17, 2002), in 149 CoNG. REC. S2582-83 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2003).
199. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 246.
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abuse of children.2 °2 Whereas § 2252A and § 2256 seek to prohibit
only images of real children while preventing guilty individuals
from going free by raising a claim that the government cannot prove
the images to be of real children, § 1466A seeks to punish people for
possession and distribution of clearly virtual child pornography (in
addition to traditional child pornography) as a form of obscenity.
There are two offenses in the statute, one for a person who pro-
duces, distributes, or possesses with the intent to distribute, and
another for mere possessors.20 3 Thus, two questions immediately
arise: (1) whether the statute constitutes a valid proscription of
obscene material under the Miller standard; and (2) whether it is
constitutionally permissible to proscribe mere possession of
materials depicting sexually explicit conduct of minors (particularly
"virtual" minors) despite the Court's holding in Stanley that the
government could not ban mere possession of adult pornography.2 4
Under both offenses contained in § 1466A, an image that depicts
a real child engaged in sexually explicit behavior will fall under the
statute when it is "obscene."205 Although the statute does not
explicitly state what is "obscene," judicial construction will lead to
application of the Miller standard.2° Moreover, Miller required state
law to define what constituted patent offensiveness, yet when
Congress previously passed obscenity legislation and no definition
202. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 504(c), 117 Stat. 650, 680-82 (2003) (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1466A). Under the federal sentencing guidelines, a person faces the
same sentence whether they are convicted under the child pornography proscription of §
2252A or the obscenity proscription of § 1466A. See § 504(c), 117 Stat. at 682 (assigning
offenses under § 1466A to section 2G2.2 of the federal sentencing guidelines); U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(a)(1) (2004), available at
http'J/www.ussc.gov/2004guid/gl2004.pdf (equating the base offense level of mere possession
of obscene materials § 1466A with the mere possession of child pornography under § 2252A
and also equating all other offenses under § 1466A with all other offenses under § 2252A).
Thus, Congress clearly intended that persons face the same punishment whether the content
for which they are convicted is actual child pornography or merely obscene virtual child
pornography. Both the appropriateness of this scheme as a matter of policy and its application
post-United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), however, are beyond the scope of this Note.
203. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1466A(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2005).
204. For a description of Stanley v. Georgia, see discussion supra Part I.B.3.
205. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1466A(a)(1)(B), (b)(1)(B).
206. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 114-16 (1974) (holding that the statutory
use of the generic term "obscene" by itself without defining obscenity using the Miller
standard should be construed to be compliant with Miller and does not cause the statute to
be void for vagueness).
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of patent offensiveness had been included, the Supreme Court found
that the factfinder must interpret what is patently offensive on a
case-by-case basis." 7 Thus, the proscription of images depicting real
children through the obscenity offense of § 1466A is constitutionally
sound.
However, the provisions for depictions of what "appears to be" a
minor engaged in certain sexually explicit acts under both offenses
require only that the image "lack[] serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value" rather than be "obscene" or explicitly spell out
the three tests under Miller. °8 In Free Speech Coalition, the Court
made clear that "the CPPA [could not] be read to prohibit obscenity
because it lacks the required link between its prohibitions and the
affront to community standards prohibited by the definition of
obscenity."20 9 There is no reason to believe that the Court will be
more willing to allow material that falls under this section to be
proscribed without the full employment of the Miller standard when
it was clearly unwilling to do so in the context of the CPPA, which
was much narrower in its focus. Thus, because the proscription of
images that "appear to be" those of a child engaged in sexually
explicit behavior under subparagraph 2(A) of the section only
applies one of the three prongs of the Miller test, without regard to
whether the image appeals to the prurient interest or is patently
offensive to community standards, it is sure to fail constitutional
review.
The second issue presented by § 1466A is whether it is constitu-
tionally permissible to proscribe mere possession of obscene
materials depicting sexually explicit conduct of minors (particularly
"virtual" minors) despite the Court's holding in Stanley v. Georgia
that the government could not ban mere possession of adult
pornography.21 ° The Court in Stanley explicitly held that "the mere
private possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be
207. Karen Weiss, Note, "But She Was Only a Child. That is Obscene!" The
Unconstitutionality of Past and Present Attempts To Ban Virtual Child Pornography and the
Obscenity Alternative, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 228, 247 (2002) (citing Smith v. United States,
431 U.S. 291, 299-308 (1977)).
208. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1466A(a)(2), (b)(2). Indeed, the test provided under the paragraph of the
statute encompasses only the third prong of the Miller standard. See supra text accompanying
note 37.
209. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002).
210. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
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made a crime."211 The decision in Osborne v. Ohio21 2 allowed the
government to proscribe possession of sexually explicit images of
real children. 2 3 The Court in Free Speech Coalition unambiguously
stated, however, that a similar proscription with regard to virtual
child pornography was impermissible precisely because of the effects
that the production of real child pornography has on its victims and
the lack of a victim in the production of virtual child pornography.1 4
Consequently, if there is no victim in the production of the material,
the statute amounts to little more than the government's attempt
"to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity."2 5
Alternatively, the statute could be viewed to be necessary to protect
children from pedophiles who might use the material to seduce
them. The Court in Free Speech Coalition reiterated, however, that
either rationale is impermissible because "[tihe government 'cannot
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling
a person's private thoughts.'" 2 6 Thus, proscribing mere possession
of virtual child pornography is inconsistent with the Court's prior
holdings and will likely not survive judicial review.217
A third issue that has been raised by critics of § 1466A is that the
affirmative defense provided by the section does not allow a
defendant to raise the issue that the sexually explicit material was
not created with a real child.1 8 Critics argue that not allowing such
211. Id.; see also discussion supra Part I.B.3.
212. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
213. Id. at 111; see also discussion supra Part I.B.5.
214. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 235-36, 250-51.
215. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
216. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 253 (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566).
217. Some have theorized that possession may be proscribable in certain situations. In
particular, with respect to the argument that the government has a compelling interest to
prevent pedophiles from using "virtual" child pornography to seduce children, the government
could prohibit possession of such materials if it narrowly tailored the statute such that the
proscription applied in areas where children could be solicited (i.e., school grounds or public
park). See Samantha L. Friel, Note, Porn By Any Other Name? A Constitutional Alternative
to Regulating "Victimless" Computer-Generated Child Pornography, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 207,
248-49 (1997). Although an interesting hypothesis, Friel suggests the very reason such a
statute may not succeed: a state "cannot prohibit virtual child pornography based on the
possibility that the material might be improperly used." Id. at 249 (emphasis added); see also
supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. Still, the idea has some merit and can be
analogized easily to the common prohibition of firearms on school campuses.
218. The affirmative defense provided under § 1466A may be invoked only if the defendant
possessed fewer than three images and "promptly and in good faith ... took reasonable steps
to destroy each such depiction; or reported the matter to a law enforcement agency and
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a defense is directly contrary to the Court's holding in Free Speech
Coalition.219 Such an argument misses the point, however. The
purpose of § 1466A is not to proscribe content because it is child
pornography, but rather because it is obscene. The Miller standard
for obscenity does not require that the sexually explicit conduct
depict actual human beings for it to be deemed obscene. 220 Thus,
whether the affirmative defense provided under the section allows
for a defendant to raise the issue that the person depicted is not a
real child is irrelevant. As noted, the true problem with § 1466A as
currently written is that it does not fully apply the Miller standard.
Establishing an obscenity offense for virtual child pornography is
the most appropriate method of proscribing that form of sexually
explicit material. The statute fails, however, to apply the Miller
standard in its entirety. Moreover, the statute proscribes mere
possession of virtual child pornography, which on its face runs
against the Court's decision in Stanley. Although the government
may argue, among other things, that the statute as written is
needed to prevent pedophiles from using virtual child pornography
to seduce children, such arguments have already been rejected by
the Court. As a result, the obscenity offenses provided under
§ 1466A as to virtual child pornography and its mere possession are
unlikely to withstand judicial review.
CONCLUSION
Protecting children from the abuse of sexual predators is of
utmost national importance. Clearly, advances in technology have
made that task harder because prior laws made no distinction
between materials depicting images of real children engaged in
sexually explicit conduct from those depicting "virtual" children,
giving rise to criminal defendants charging that the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identities of depicted
afforded that agency access to each such visual depiction." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1466A(e)(2) (West
Supp. 2005). Indeed, the section specifically states whether an actual child is depicted in the
image is not a required element of any offense under the section. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1466A(c).
219. See Joseph J. Beard, Virtual Kiddie Porn: A Real Crime? An Analysis of the PROTECT
Act, 21 ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Summer 2003, 3, 6; John P. Feldmeier, Close Enough for
Government Work: An Examination of Congressional Efforts To Reduce the Government's
Burden of Proof in Child Pornography Cases, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 205, 227 (2003).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
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children. In responding to these changes in technology, however,
Congress must still respect the First Amendment's protection of
speech and the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process.
The PROTECT Act has in large measure done so by responding
to the Supreme Court's concerns of the CPPA's overbreadth. The
statutory definition of child pornography has been amended such
that the sphere of proscribable speech has been significantly
reduced. As a result, the statute does not proscribe a "substantial"
amount of protected expression. Further, the statute's affirmative
defense saves otherwise protected speech from falling within the
ambit of the statute. Thus, the statute now adequately protects
individuals from prosecution for possession of materials not
produced using actual children.
At the same time, the statute ensures that prosecutors can
continue to pursue those individuals who produce and possess
"real" child pornography-thereby helping to bring an end to the
exploitation of children in its production-without fear of defen-
dants escaping prosecution merely by invoking the "virtual child
pornography defense" to force the government to prove the
identity of the child depicted in the imagery in question. This is
accomplished by virtue of the constitutionally sound rebuttable
presumption created by the revised definition of child pornography
that includes imagery which is indistinguishable from real children
in combination with the revised affirmative defense.
Finally, the attempt by Congress to proscribe virtual child
pornography as obscene was on the right track, but it may very well
fall short upon judicial review. Although an obscenity offense is the
most appropriate way of proscribing content not produced with
actual children, the statute as written fails to apply the standard of
Miller v. California in its entirety. The Court made clear in Free
Speech Coalition that the failure to use the Miller standard in
proscribing virtual child pornography will not survive judicial
review. Moreover, the statute proscribes mere possession, which on
its face runs against the Court's decision in Stanley v. Georgia.
James Nicholas Kornegay*
* I would like to thank my good friend Captain Chris Johnson, USMC, for suggesting
this issue as the topic for this Note.
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